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Rethinking critical thinking: A relational and contextual 
approach 
 




Contemporary discussions of critical thinking lack serious consideration of students’ 
thinking-processes as phenomena embedded within the contexts of psychological and 
interpersonal relationships.  This paper departs from past and present approaches to 
critical thinking pedagogy by analogizing thinking and critical thinking with forms of 
relating: to self, to others, to objects of thought, and to what we describe as “thinking-
relationships.”  The analogy of thinking with relating permits us to examine more closely 
the connections between self, psyche, student, teacher, and learning institution, and to 
apply valuable insights from the fields of social philosophy and psychoanalytic theory to 
critical thinking pedagogy and practice.  This paper introduces the metaphor of critical 
thinking as relating to one’s thinking-relationships, explores the contexts in which such 
critical thinking-relationships are embedded, identifies hidden desires, defenses, and 
fantasies that may hinder the development of critical thinking, and concludes by 
reflecting upon the link between the ethical development of the person and the ideal of 
critical thinking.   
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Critical thinking has become one of the most popular ideals in American education.  Yet 
despite the ubiquity of the term on course syllabi, program descriptions, and mission statements, 
scholars remain sharply divided over the definition of the concept.  What exactly does “critical 
thinking” mean? What distinguishes critical thinking from other forms of thinking? How can 
teachers “teach” critical thinking and how can we assess whether students are actually thinking 
critically?  
 
Introduction and Historical Overview 
 
The “critical thinking” construct rose to prominence in the mid-twentieth century as part 
of a concerted national effort to foster civic responsibility, economic efficiency, and 
psychological fulfillment among the American public (Educational Policies Commission, 1938).  
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Not only would the modern American critical thinker be able to use inductive inference to make 
sensible judgments in his personal, professional, and civic life, but he would also be immune to 
the lure of fascist, communist, and other anti-democratic propaganda (Glaser, 1942; Anderson et 
al., 1944). E.M. Glaser, for instance, maintained that “the study of the development of ability to 
think critically is concerned with a much larger problem – the problem of how American schools 
can educate more effectively for responsible and competent citizenship in our representative 
democracy” (1942, 409).  And in 1939, Wayland Osborn wrote that “today the school is being 
increasingly called upon to teach resistance to propaganda.  Social studies teachers in particular 
are expected to develop in their pupils habits of critical thinking with respect to controversial 
social issues.  If social studies teachers aim to immunize their pupils against propaganda, they 
must organize effective curricular materials for classroom use.” (1) 
 
Over the subsequent decades, the notion of critical thinking came to mean systematically 
analyzing arguments, avoiding logical fallacies, adhering to the rules of logic, and (where 
possible) applying the scientific method (Ennis, 1962; McPeck, 1981; Paul, 1984; Siegel, 1991).  
While there are numerous definitions of critical thinking within this context, the pithiest is 
offered by Robert Ennis (1996): Critical thinking is “reasonable and reflective thinking focused 
on deciding what to believe or do” (p. 166). 
 
This conception of critical thinking (what may be referred to as the ‘First Wave’) remains 
the most popular approach among contemporary educators, although it has not been without its 
critics.  Perhaps the most vocal criticism of the idea of critical thinking as rational argumentation 
has arisen from the Critical Pedagogy movement, whose distinct understanding of “criticality” 
can be traced to the group of social theorists heavily influenced by Marx and Freud known as the 
Frankfurt School (see e.g., Horkheimer, 1947; Marcuse, 1964; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; 
Adorno, 1973).  The theorists of the Frankfurt School saw in the modern ideals of Reason, Logic, 
and Science not the pursuit of objective truth but political ideologies, that is, instruments of 
power wielded by economic and political institutions.  In the same vein, for Critical Pedagogues, 
critical thinking has less to do with pursuing rational or logical perfection than with interrogating 
and resisting oppressive aspects of the dominant social, political, and economic orders.  For 
example, in Pedagogy of the Oppressed — widely regarded as the seminal text of this movement 
— Paolo Freire offers a strikingly “political” definition of critical thinking as “thinking which 
discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy 
between them… thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses 
itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved” (2000, p. 92). 
 
Advocates of the Critical Pedagogy movement such as Henry Giroux (1978) and Laura 
Kaplan (1991) have criticized the First Wave conception of critical thinking as profoundly 
uncritical, both in its idealization of disembodied reason and logic, and in its apparent 
encouragement of political conformity.  Far more skeptical of the universal validity of Reason 
and the necessity of heeding scientific (or social-scientific) truth claims, ‘Second Wave’ figures, 
in keeping with Max Weber’s (2002) distinction between Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität, 
understand critical thinking not merely as instrumental thinking (i.e., finding the most effective 
means to achieve a given end), but as value-laden or ends-oriented thinking that addresses itself 
to issues like justice and equality.  For example, Marianna Papastephanou and Charoula Angeli 
(2007) argue that critical thinking is more about the “problematization” of what has been “taken 
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for granted” than about the means of “solving problematic situations or impasses within the 
system” (p. 613).  Over the past several decades, First and Second Wave thinkers have engaged 
in an acrimonious debate over the nature and purpose of critical thinking, with each side 
accusing the other of being insufficiently critical. 
 
Despite intense debates over the nature and purpose of critical thinking, we have found a 
surprising consensus regarding the notion that critical thinking should be an institution-wide (and 
even nation-wide) educational goal, implemented across curricula and pursed in most if not all 
courses of study.  We disagree with this widely-held assumption, for there seems to be little 
reason or evidence to suggest that critical thinking holds equal applicability across academic 
disciplines.  Indeed, in many cases — for instance, in a course on mathematics or organic 
chemistry — the amount of time a student devotes to developing critical thinking-relationships 
may be less than in other courses, for more time may be reserved for learning to apply the 
standards, practices, and procedures of a discipline with skill and precision.  Such a claim is in 
no way meant to denigrate the importance or complexity of fields like mathematics or chemistry.  
It is, rather, to say that students of all subjects are best-served by attending to several forms of 
thinking-training: not only critical thinking but scientific thinking, analytical thinking, 
mathematical thinking, theory-to-practice thinking, and so on.   
 
The demand that critical thinking be omnipresent in education has been a significant 
cause of the depletion of the meaning of critical thinking, for, if critical thinking must apply to 
every course, then it must remain vague and ill-defined.  At the same time, the pretense that 
critical thinking is easily taught and can be applied in all areas lends a false aura of criticality to 
many quite uncritical teaching and learning practices, sometimes undertaken by those with little 
or no training or scholarly interest in critical thinking themselves.  The following discussion is 
therefore limited to the domain of instruction in critical thinking and to academic courses and 
curricular activities where the development of critical thinking is a primary objective.  To the 
extent that critical thinking is or ought to be a pedagogical goal, as in many core curricula, in 
several disciplines of the Humanities and Social Sciences, in advanced graduate training, and the 
like, we hope the following exploration of the relational and contextual dynamics of critical 
thinking will prove useful.   
 
A Relational Definition of Critical Thinking 
 
Perhaps the most common modern pedagogical paradigm is that referred to by Paulo 
Freire as the “banking concept of education” (2000).  According to the “banking concept,” the 
teacher is imagined to “deposit” knowledge into the empty minds of students, who, over time, 
increase their cognitive “accounts” and, ultimately, leverage their intellectual “capital” against 
academic or everyday problems.  For several decades, this paradigm has been critiqued as 
pedagogically and philosophically untenable, for it consigns the student to a passive role and the 
teacher to an authoritarian one, while equating the process of learning with thoughtless ingestion 
or consumption.   
 
But in spite of educators’ trenchant criticism of and attempts to reform this paradigm, 
traces of the basic assumptions of the banking concept have remained in force.  Throughout 
contemporary literatures on critical thinking, for instance, one finds the assertion that a primary 
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(sometimes the primary) benefit of critical thinking is that its “value” will be retained by the 
student after the academic year ends (see e.g., Foundation for critical thinking, 2013; hooks, 
2010).  The “value” of critical thinking is imagined to have a “long-term yield” because critical 
thinking is currently understood as a bundle of critical knowledge, skills, and attitudes (McClune 
& Jarman, 2010).  Even if this bundle comes to be instilled in the student in the most progressive 
or innovative ways — through student-led projects, experiential learning, or critical reflection 
exercises — the metaphor that students must “bank” a bundle of critical knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes remains intact.  For example, and perhaps ironically, a recent Wall Street Journal article 
reports that mentions of “critical thinking” in corporate employers’ job postings have doubled 
since 2009, while in a typical interview for the global banking firm Goldman Sachs, job 
candidates are asked “to assess company valuations and stock pitches and then to explain how 
they arrived at their conclusions.”  Michael Desmarais, Head of Recruiting, explains that “by the 
end of one of those exercises, the candidates should have displayed whether they possess critical 
thinking” (Korn, 2014).  
 
Such traces of the banking concept prove to be particularly unhelpful in the domain of 
critical thinking pedagogy, where teachers seek that students develop the capacity for critical 
thinking.  To view critical thinking as a capacity is to recognize the relationship between an 
individual’s ability to think critically and the organization of relationships in that individual’s 
inner world.  The capacity to think critically depends upon the individual’s achievement of an 
intellectual and psychological self-organization in which she is able to discover a form of 
autonomy within her relationships to her own thinking-habits, assumptions, and thought-objects.  
A pedagogical paradigm focused on developing the student’s capacity to think critically, 
therefore, differs radically from one devoted to training the students to adopt a set of “critical” 
knowledge, and skills, and attitudes.  The latter approach suggests that critical thinking is 
essentially a learned behavior that, if successfully assimilated, may be repeated and re-applied 
by the individual.   
 
Knowledge, skills, and attitudes, when conceived of as bundles or modules to be 
transmitted to and retained by the student, have very little to do with the student’s capacity to 
achieve the kind of flexibility and autonomy in psychic organization required for critical 
thinking.  We might compare, for instance, the case of the pedagogical goal of creativity.  It is 
widely recognized that, although creative artists, for instance, may develop their capacities 
through study, research, and practice, a teacher can not simply “teach creativity” or “produce 
creative thinkers” by providing students with a bundle of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that are 
equivalent to “being creative” or that yield “creative thinking.”  What is needed in a pedagogy of 
creativity is the facilitated development, enhancement, and renewal of the student’s psychic 
relationships such that the student finds the means to make contact with, and act upon, express, 
and give form to her authentic, spontaneous, creative impulses.1 
 
Similarly, what is needed in the case of critical thinking is the development, 
enhancement, or renewal of what we call the individual’s thinking-relationships.  Christopher 
Bollas (1987) has famously suggested the category of the “unthought known” to describe that 
which is never cognitively processed but nevertheless becomes a person’s basic orientation to 
self and to life (pp.  277-283).  Bollas’ argument is that, at the level of inner experience, we may 
“know” something without ever having thought about it.  It may be incorporated so completely 
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in our basic intellectual and emotional frameworks that it can only be continually rediscovered 
(repeated) in our experience.  To imagine that an individual can simply apply learned methods or 
behaviors in order to “think” about his “unthought known” would be to seriously underestimate 
the difficulty and complexity of this task.  And yet, this is a significant part of the task of critical 
thinking, such that we may even say that critical thinking must inevitably address “the unthought 
known” as one of its primary targets. 
 
Given the complexity of the task of critical thinking, we find it most helpful to conceive 
of thinking — and critical thinking — in the language of relating.  Approaching thinking as 
relating permits us to focus on the capacity to think critically and to consider how it may be most 
effectively facilitated, while allowing us to apply lessons from social philosophy and 
psychoanalytic theory to the field of critical thinking pedagogy and practice.   
 
We propose, therefore, that critical thinking be defined as the capacity to develop flexible 
and autonomous thinking-relationships not only with the objects of one’s thought, but with one’s 
own thinking-relationships.  That is, if a person (P) thinks about a thought-object (O), P may 
think about O in several ways: reasonably or unreasonably, scientifically or unscientifically, 
hastily or thoroughly.  But, more importantly, when P thinks about O, she develops what we call 
a “thinking-relationship” with O that may be expressed as P  O.  This “thinking-relationship,” 
naturally, may be characterized by her habitual relationships to thought-objects like O, or by her 
enjoyment of topics related to O, or by her fears related to the possible manifestations of O.  At 
the same time, her thinking-relationship with O is interwoven with her many other thinking-
relationships to other objects of thought (e.g., P  O2, P  O3, etc.).  Critical thinking, then, is 
the activity of thinking about one’s own thinking-relationships, such that P thinks about her 
thinking-relationship, P  O, and then, very likely, P  O2, P  O3, and so on.  This 
formulation of critical thinking may be expressed symbolically as P  [P  O]. 
 
We believe this definition is both distinct and more exact than Elder & Paul’s (2012) 
well-known summary of critical thinking as “thinking about thinking” (see also Kuhn, 1999; 
Halpern, 1998).  If, as we argue, thinking may be analogized with a relationship, then critical 
thinking may be understood as the activity of continuously renewing the relationships between 
the thinker and his thinking-relationships, such that his thinking-relationships are transformed 
into thought-objects, themselves.  To be able to think about one’s thinking-relationships requires 
that one develop a particular kind of relationship with one’s relationships to thought-objects.  
That is, one’s relationships to thought-objects may be governed, as we have suggested, by 
tradition, or by experience, or by what one was taught in grammar school, or by prejudice.  To 
think about one’s thinking-relationships means to stand in relation to them in such a way that one 
may examine their sources, their tendencies and patterns, and the motivations, desires, fears, and 
fantasies operating in them.  If establishing, or attempting to establish, such a relationship with 
one’s own thinking-relationships is fraught with danger (the danger, perhaps, of uncovering an 
undesirable truth about one’s own thinking, or the danger of betraying a thinking-relationship 
that has proven useful in one’s life, or the danger of losing connection with a special object of 
thought, etc.) then the individual’s capacity to think critically will be severely restricted.   
 
Thinking-Relationships in Context 
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The critical thinking-relationship we have described above is inextricable from the 
contexts of pedagogical relationships between teachers, students, and learning institutions.  
Teachers, students, and learning institutions, of course, relate to each other in a variety of ways: 
physically, by coming together regularly in a space that defines the group or class; 
communicatively, by way of the myriad oral and written communications that constitute the day-
to-day work of courses, including class discussions, lectures, essays, assignments, examinations, 
etc.; politically, by operating within organizations whose dynamics are influenced by their 
missions, values, power-structures, financial needs, leaders, community partners, etc.; and 
psychologically and intellectually, in that teachers, students, and representatives of learning 
institutions possess and exchange desires, fears, fantasies, ideas, and opinions about themselves 
and about each other that affect pedagogical relationships in often unseen yet powerful ways.   
 
Since teachers and students establish profound and multifaceted relationships with each 
other in their coursework, it is easy to imagine the difference between (a) a teacher-student 
relationship that facilitates the student’s potential thinking-relationships and (b) a teacher-student 
relationship that obstructs or circumvents the student’s potential thinking-relationships.  Let’s 
imagine the thought-object in question to be Shakespeare’s Hamlet.  A teacher who inserts 
himself between the student and the thought-object, such that the student can only think what the 
teacher thinks about Hamlet, prevents the student from developing an autonomous thinking-
relationship with Hamlet.   
 
This unfortunate scenario is equally imaginable in the case of the student’s potential 
critical thinking-relationships.  Here, we may imagine a teacher who permits the student to think 
about Hamlet, but who does not permit the student to think about how she [the student] thinks 
about Hamlet.  Perhaps she is encouraged to read and reflect upon Hamlet, and it is left at that.  
Or perhaps she is permitted to form her own impressions of Hamlet, based, presumably, upon its 
connection with her other thought-objects and thinking-relationships, but is given no space, aid, 
or encouragement to undertake the work of reflecting upon or challenging these relationships or 
these impressions.  In the language of relationships, the teacher, in this scenario, permits a 
relationship to develop between the student and the thought-object (Hamlet), but does not permit 
the student to develop the critical thinking-relationship between herself and her thinking-
relationship to Hamlet and to thought-objects like Hamlet.  That is, the teacher does not facilitate 
the student’s critical relating to her own thinking-relationships.2   
 
In the critical thinking pedagogy we advance here, the key is to ensure that the 
relationship between teacher and student facilitates rather than contravenes the relationships 
between the student and his thinking-relationships.  It is not, as we hope to show, merely a matter 
of not intruding.  The teacher must be an active facilitator, a provider, even a sort of conductor, 
such that the complex circuitry of a student’s thinking-relationships may be examined, tested, 
and potentially re-wired without either overheating or shutting down.   
 
As critical thinking-relationships are embedded within relationships between teachers, 
students, and learning institutions, these latter relationships must not be governed by exploitation 
or abuse if they are to serve the genuine interests of students.  In what follows, we outline several 
risks in pedagogical relationships in the hope of drawing attention to ways in which the critical 
thinking endeavor may be disrupted by interfering desires, fears, or fantasies.  It would be 
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unfortunate, of course, if the following analyses were taken to be a suggestion that educators are 
selfish, thoughtless, or somehow disinterested in students’ welfare.  Quite often, the opposite is 
the case.  Nevertheless, even individuals and groups with the best of intentions are subject to 
human social and psychological pressures, and it is the job of those responsible for facilitating 
critical thinking to recognize and address those pressures to serve students’ genuine interests.  In 
what follows, we undertake an examination of the teacher’s and the student’s relationships with 
each other, with the thought-objects of courses, with departmental and institutional priorities, and 
with their mutual desires, in order to reflect upon their dynamics and consequences in the domain 
of critical thinking.   
 
Aggression and Defense  
 
We begin by considering the likelihood that the broad consensus about the inherent value 
of critical thinking covers up an aggressiveness among scholars and teachers engaged with the 
issue.  Certainly, the various “camps” of critical thinking scholars (some of which we have 
identified above) are invested in defending their interpretations of critical thinking and in 
accusing others’ of being uncritical.  Perhaps such behavior is no surprise; after all, when 
engaged with critical thinking, we are encouraged to be “on guard” against inadequate evidence, 
unproven assumptions, invalid proofs, and flawed arguments.  We are exhorted to search out 
faults in thinking and to “look for trouble,” in several senses.   
 
“To think critically is always to be hostile,” said Hannah Arendt (2013), perhaps 
mistaking critical thinking for that form of moral and political action that she glamorized (see 
Arendt, 1958), not without earning her share of criticism.  The idea, popular in some circles, that 
critical thinking is not only incidentally contentious, but is contentiousness itself, makes the 
activity of critical thinking into an instinctively aggressive posture that may often be antithetical 
to the autonomous and flexible relationships to one’s own thinking-relationships we have 
described above.   
 
If the intellectual vigilance associated with critical thinking is really an expression of 
aggression or hostility, then critical thinking becomes a sort of weapon.  And if critical thinking 
becomes a weapon, an understandable goal in critical thinking would be to ensure that the 
weapon is never pointed at the self, but is always pointed at someone else.  As Michael S. Roth 
(2012) has recently argued, students (particularly in the Humanities) are regularly encouraged to 
be “critical unmaskers” who demonstrate their intelligence by identifying the flaws, limitations, 
and inconsistencies in others’ arguments.  While intelligent criticism and critique certainly have 
their place within and beyond the classroom, they can also serve the aggressive and sadistic 
purpose of taking “delight in being able to show that somebody else is not to be believed” (p. 
235).  Surely, it is not just students in the Humanities (and many other disciplines), but also their 
teachers who display this attitude in their courses and in their research.  Needless to say, the 
image of turning a fearsome intellectual weapon upon others so as to avoid having it turned upon 
oneself contrasts sharply with the critical psychic organization we have described above: one that 
is capable of exploring the self’s own thinking-relationships and of challenging assumptions and 
tendencies therein that no longer suit the individual’s authentic needs and desires.   
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If critical thinking may be reduced to a hostile enterprise, then we must know from where 
such hostility derives.  Since aggression is often mobilized in self-defense, we might consider the 
ways in which critical thinking threatens or is perceived to threaten the self.  Shoshana Felman 
(1982), among others, has argued that knowledge and ignorance must be understood within the 
“structural dynamic” of pedagogical relationships, where they express not abundance and lack 
but, rather, a seeking of and resistance to knowledge (p. 30).  Although the nature of 
psychological resistance is conceptualized differently by various schools of psychology, in every 
case resistance protects something vital to the self.  One who seeks to challenge or break down 
resistance, then, can not fail to encounter aggression mounted in what is perceived to be self-
protection or, in some cases, self-preservation.  Teachers’ and students’ confrontations with their 
(shared) resistances to learning and thinking, which must be a part of developing a critical 
thinking-relationship to their thinking-relationships, will often occasion hostility and aggression 
by students and teachers alike, as fears may arise that cherished beliefs will not withstand critical 
scrutiny, or that humiliating intellectual flaws will be exposed for all to see.   
 
Thus, Felman’s claim, that proper teaching involves the “creation of a new condition of 
knowledge — the creation of an original learning-disposition” (p. 31), is well-taken but 
somewhat misses the mark.  For, if Felman is right that a resistance to thinking and learning is at 
the heart of the matter, then she is wrong to imagine that it is the teacher’s task to instill in the 
student “an original learning-disposition” that will help the student overcome such resistance.  
As Felman often compares the pedagogical relationship to the psycho-therapeutic one, we might 
imagine how inappropriate it would be for a therapist to attempt to instill in a patient any 
particular disposition, even one of ‘openness’ or ‘well-being’ or ‘mental health.’ Rather, the task 
of the therapist must be to facilitate the process by which the patient, herself, explores, discovers, 
and creates (or re-creates) her own authentic disposition.  Teachers of critical thinking who, with 
the best of intentions, see it as their task to instill “an original learning-disposition” or “a critical 
thinking disposition” or, in some other way, to defeat students’ resistances to thinking are 
overstepping their limits and powers.  Such teachers are almost certain to entrench the 
resistances and activate the defenses of students who must now protect themselves against what 
can only be perceived as a kind of assault by the teacher upon the student’s current state of 
thinking and being.   
 
Unlike Felman’s, Jacques Rancière’s (1991) critique of education is focused on the 
hierarchical relationship between teacher and student, where the former is assumed to be all-
knowing and the latter ignorant.  The traditional educational process by which the teacher 
regulates what students are exposed to, gradually revealing his knowledge through the process of 
“explanation,” makes students helplessly dependent on the teacher because “to explain 
something to someone is first of all to show him he cannot understand it by himself” (p. 6).  The 
goal for Rancière, as for Freire, and indeed for Felman, is to cultivate a pedagogical relationship 
in which the teacher demands that students respect the powers of their own intellects, “to make 
emancipated and emancipating men” (p. 101).  Unlike traditional (hierarchical) educational 
relationships, Rancière’s ideal teacher would teach without assuming the possession and 
transmission of knowledge. 
 
Rancière’s critique of the power-structure behind the “banking concept” of education 
discussed earlier is well-made, but even if the power-disparity between teacher and student were 
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minimized by a teacher’s refusal to presume knowledge — and it is not clear that this refusal 
would have this effect — students who perceive that they are being “ma[d]e” by a teacher into a 
certain kind of person, even an “emancipated and emancipating” one, are just as likely to raise 
their defenses and mount resistances as against an authoritarian figure.  Indeed, students may 
find the teacher who pretends not to know to be more threatening because her expectations, 
demands, and methods are mysterious.   
 
One of the most difficult paradoxes of teaching critical thinking is that, if students 
undertake the work of critical thinking because they have acceded to the will of the teacher, then 
they have given up something vital to the process of critical thinking, itself: namely, the 
development of an autonomous relationship to their own thinking-relationships.  That is, a 
student who thinks critically because he is told to do so is no longer able to think critically about 
that command or his willingness to obey it.  In this way, teaching critical thinking reminds us of 
the double-bind of enjoining someone to “think for himself.” If the student obeys the command, 
then, by definition, he is not thinking for himself.  But if he refuses the command to think for 
himself, then he is left no alternative but not to think for himself.  That is, teachers who attempt 
to “create” in the student a new disposition, or who in insidious ways attempt to “change” 
students’ beliefs or dispositions will be (rightly) perceived as aggressors seeking to alter or 
restructure students’ own psychic organizations, which is an attack on how they think, how they 
feel, and who they are.   
 
Narcissism and Degradation 
 
Despite the significant differences in the First and Second Wave conceptualizations of 
critical thinking, nearly all literatures of critical thinking agree that students are deficient in some 
manner.  The assumption that the student is flawed in some significant way is implicit in many 
educational discourses, simply by way of the suggestion that it is the teacher’s duty to change the 
student for the better.  In many discussions of critical thinking, the primary flaws of students 
involve their susceptibility to being misled by fallacious arguments, by persuasive but ultimately 
intellectually bankrupt material (like advertisements), by conventional wisdom, by the influence 
of tradition or authority, by emotional appeals and ad hominem attacks, and the like.   
 
For ‘First Wave’ critical pedagogues, such flaws prevent students from discovering the 
reasonable or objective truth.  For Critical Pedagogues, these flaws prevent students from 
piercing the veil of political and economic ideology that masks fundamental injustices in the 
social order.  In both cases, the goal of critical thinking is imagined to be the correction of such 
deficiencies in students, thereby allowing them to perceive the world “as it actually is.” As 
Burbules & Berk (1999) note, both traditional critical thinking theories and critical pedagogies 
are premised on the teacher’s ability to direct students “to overcome ignorance, to test the 
distorted against the true, to ground effective human action in an accurate sense of social reality” 
(p. 53).  
 
Today, both within the domain of critical thinking and without, concerns about “student 
narcissism” abound.  The latest generation of college students, sometimes known as 
“millennials,” or, as Jean Twenge (2006; Twenge & Campbell, 2009) calls them, members of 
“Generation Me” are frequently described as uniquely “narcissistic.”  Unfortunately, for Twenge 
9
Bowker and Fazioli: Rethinking Critical Thinking
http://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/phs/vol6/iss1/1
Bowker & Fazioli 10 
and others, “narcissism” has lost its analytic precision and has come to be confused with 
excessive self-love and self-centeredness.  Contrary to its popular usage, however, narcissism 
actually denotes a self-experience of profound loss and emptiness, such that the narcissistic 
individual must constantly make up for the tremendous deficiencies she finds in herself; hence, 
the over-compensating displays of grandiosity, the need for constant positive recognition by 
others, and the desperate acquisition of marks or trappings of elite status (see Lasch, 1979). 
 
Popular yet inaccurate diagnoses of widespread “narcissism” have coincided with 
characterizations of today’s students as lacking “grit” (Duckworth et al., 2007).  The “grit” 
argument claims that young people, over-indulged by permissive parents and relaxed cultural 
standards, require more rigorous training in toughness and self-control if they are to master the 
painful experiences of life and work.  Calls for increased “grit” cohere with the accusations of 
narcissism in that they both claim that today’s young people lack the toughness needed to 
survive in an exacting adult world that demands humility, pain, and sacrifice in order to 
accomplish meaningful goals.   
 
One wonders, of course, whether the exacting and painful vision of the adult world held 
up by these scholars as ‘reality’ is not, in fact, a cruel fantasy in which young people must be 
made to suffer, perhaps in the same ways that earlier generations have suffered or have imagined 
themselves to have suffered.  Indeed, the imagination of students as narcissistic and lacking grit 
would seem to suggest that the solution to today’s putative “youth crisis” lies in increased 
harshness, in the steady deprivation of kindness, nurturing, indulgence, or care.  This line of 
thinking would seem to threaten students with a world of pain and misery, to which they must 
become accustomed now, or else face even greater pain and misery later.   
 
But the logic upon which such arguments rely is not defensible.  As Heinz Kohut (1971) 
noted, difficulties in school or work, that is, difficulties in mobilizing effort toward defined 
goals, are not the result of excessive self-esteem but the opposite: “Many of the most severe and 
chronic work disturbances,” he argues, are “due to the fact that the self is poorly cathected with 
narcissistic libido and in chronic danger of fragmentation” (p. 120).  Part of the reason for this — 
a full account of which is beyond the scope of this paper — involves the fact that self-regard, 
self-respect and self-love are healthy parts of the development of a person.  And a person, even a 
developing person, has the capacity to set goals relating to study or work that are (at least partly) 
self-generated and self-endorsed, rather than painful, alienating impingements.  The difference 
between these two types of experiences is considerable: If there is “a living self in depth [that] 
has become the organizing center of the ego’s activities,” then the individual’s work is 
“undertaken on his own initiative rather than as if by a passively obedient automaton,… [with] 
some originality rather than being humdrum and routine” (p. 120). 
 
To understand why educators, in particular, would be so quick to embrace the idea that 
students are flawed — and not merely flawed by ignorance but deficient in some essential 
aspects of their character — we must recognize that the narcissistic dilemma being described is 
one faced not by students but by teachers, and when faced with a narcissistic dilemma, the 
degradation of others and the aggrandizement of the self are often two sides of the same coin.  
That is, our work with students makes students easy to exploit in a situation where educators and 
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educational institutions are increasingly confronted with severe “losses” (of resources, of 
personnel, of prestige) and increasingly experience themselves as “empty” of value. 
 
The educational vocation has suffered from a great many blows to its esteem in recent 
decades.  Today’s teachers practice in a climate that often devalues their work, in spite of the lip 
service regularly paid to the importance of teachers by politicians running for elected office.  
Consider, first, learning institutions’ own statements of their priorities, which frequently center 
upon the promise that the institution will prepare the student for the day when she will finally 
enter “the real world,” which lies, of course, “beyond the campus walls.” Indeed, the advertising 
slogan of a college in New York State proclaims to prospective students: “When you’re here, 
you’re almost there” (D’Youville College website, 2015).  This curious notion, that when a 
student is “here,” at the college, he is, in effect, nowhere, reminds us that even educators may be 
complicit in reproducing a vision of the learning institution as a place somehow outside of “real 
life,” a place from where one must emerge in order to arrive somewhere.  Certainly, the 
pejorative depiction of the university as an “Ivory Tower,” now almost universally rejected by 
educators as the most undesirable of portrayals, figured students as prisoners locked away in 
impenetrable fortresses, surviving only on the consumption of dusty, old books and dead, stale 
ideas (see Bowker, 2012).   
 
Low salaries, negative media portrayals, and disparaging public discourses about 
teaching and education are also part of the strained relationship between today’s learning 
institutions and “the real world.” This relationship, so far, has been one-sided, such that what 
happens in “the real world” confers value on the work of the learning institution, which must 
constantly adapt its practices to suit the changing needs of employers, the economy, 
governmental agencies, and the like.  At an even more concrete level, educational institutions are 
today increasingly dependent upon monetary grants and awards, alumni donations, corporate 
gifts, and productive public relations campaigns just to assure their own financial survival.  Thus, 
if learning institutions are empty or worthless unless they orient themselves toward and appeal to 
“the real world” that exists beyond their gates, then educators and teachers risk internalizing a 
very negative self-attribution of meaninglessness along with an implicit imperative to locate the 
value of academic work in its capacity to serve the needs of others.   
 
In this context, one wonders whether the idea of teaching students to be critical thinkers 
offers educators a chance to renew their sense of value and purpose, a chance to relieve feelings 
of devaluation and degradation in their own eyes or in the eyes of peers, other professionals, and 
the broader public.  If critical thinking is imagined to correct what, as we have argued above, is 
imagined to be flawed and deficient about students, particularly their self-possession and their 
contentment in false consciousness, then the case for critical thinking is a not merely case for 
liberating students from ignorance, but a case for correcting a dangerous social crisis, with wide-
ranging impacts upon the national economy, politics, and culture.  Teachers may, for instance, 
earn feelings of self-worth if they explicitly or implicitly recruit students to social causes or 
humanitarian ideologies that are believed to “make a difference” in “the real world.” 
 
What is more, such exploitation of students may be rationalized if students are imagined 
to be inherently flawed, “narcissistic,” or lazy.  In fact, while it remains surprising when 
dedicated educators disparage students, we may now see that such disparagement may actually 
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help bolster an educator’s sense of her own importance and efficacy.  Of course, if critical 
thinking platforms are used to serve teachers’ and learning institutions’ desires to feel valued in 
this way, then they degrade and exploit students while pretending to offer students 
enlightenment, and, in so doing, undermine the genuinely critical capacities of students.   
 
The Denial of Desire and the Desire of the Other 
 
The adjective “critical” lends a special aura of superiority to the noun “thinking,” such 
that — whether critical thinking be construed as logical thinking or as politically liberatory 
thinking — the term often functions to conceal the presence of the teacher’s or the learning 
institution’s desires, some of which we have just discussed.  Most if not all critical thinking 
discourses have colluded in imagining a privileged category of thinking, the unconscious goal of 
which is to disavow the presence of desire by attending to (and often becoming preoccupied 
with) the ostensibly rigorous standards required to earn the “critical” seal of approval.  The 
consensus that we must teach critical thinking at every opportunity has created a situation in 
which the practice of critical thinking is overrun by the unacknowledged desires and fantasies of 
researchers, teachers, administrators, governmental agencies, and other related organizations.   
 
Put another way, the current discourses of critical thinking permit teachers, learning 
institutions, and students to participate in the fantasy that there can be a kind of thinking without 
desire: a pure and innocent thinking.  If we recall the metaphor of thinking as relating, then we 
can see why this fantasy is so attractive.  The idea that it is possible for an individual to relate to 
a thought-object without the interference of desire entails the idea that the individual may relate 
to the thought-object “objectively,” may comprehend the thought-object “in itself” or “just as it 
is.” The desire to relate to a thought-object in this way derives from the desire to psychologically 
identify with or incorporate the thought-object in its pure and uncorrupted form.  That is, the 
desire to relate to thought-objects purely and innocently means, at the level of psychic 
experience, the desire to identify with and incorporate things “as they are,” things that are 
inherently true, natural, correct, or right.  Ironically, the desire to think about an object “just as it 
is” is really a desire not to think about it at all, but to establish an im-mediate (i.e., not mediated 
by thought) relationship with it.  In psychoanalytic language, this desire would be expressed as 
the desire to merge or fuse with an object.  Merger or fusion is desired because it seems to offer 
the individual a way to make contact with or incorporate the desirable aspects or qualities of the 
object.  This suggests that two of the fundamental desires driving the critical thinking movement 
are the desire to avoid thought, and the desire to cover up that desire by imagining critical 
thinking as pure and uncorrupted by desire.   
 
This complex paradox deserves more explanation.  While it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to review the philosophical and scientific traditions surrounding the idea of the ‘thing-in-
itself,’ it is easy to see that, if it were possible to make contact with a thing-in-itself, then 
imagining the thing or thinking about the thing might risk departing from its essential reality.  As 
the Renaissance essayist Michel de Montaigne (1993) would put it, the mind treats each of its 
objects “not according to the nature of the thing, but in accordance with itself.  Things in 
themselves perhaps have their own weights, measures, and states; but inwardly, when they enter 
into us, the mind cuts them to its own conceptions” (p. 131).  Today — and quite frequently in 
the five centuries between the time of Montaigne’s writing and today — there is a similar trend 
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in social theory to view “reality” as precisely that which can not be thought.  An entire tradition 
of postmodern thinkers would agree that ‘the Real’ is inaccessible to thought and language and, 
therefore, what is real is “a kind of ontological ‘collateral damage’ of symbolic operations: the 
process of symbolization is inherently thwarted, doomed to fail, and the Real is this immanent 
failure of the symbolic” (Žižek, 2012, p. 959).   
 
Thinking, for writers old and new, means preferring what pertains to the mind to what 
pertains to reality, nature, and things-in-themselves.  The danger of thinking is that the thinking 
mind, like Narcissus, falls in love with its own reflection and drowns in its own image, finding 
nothing so engaging as itself.  In keeping with this metaphor, Montaigne’s depictions of the 
activity of thought typically emphasize its self-devouring, morbid quality.  For instance, he 
writes famously that the situation of the thinking mind “is much like that of Aesop’s dogs who, 
seeing something like a dead body floating in the sea, and being unable to get near it, set about 
drinking up the water to make a dry passage, and choked themselves” (1993, pp. 347-348).   
 
The point of this brief excursus on anti-thinking currents in the Western tradition of 
philosophy is to recall that one of the uses to which the discourse of critical thinking has been put 
is to support a fantasy of a superior form of thinking, sanitized of emotion, bias, or desire.  By 
imagining itself unbeholden to self-oriented desires, critical thinking is presumed to make 
contact with what is real and true.   
 
If the critical thinking discourse offers a way to imagine a form of thinking that is pure 
and free of desire, why should this hiding of desire be necessary? That is, what is the denied 
desire? We have already suggested that a fundamental denied desire is the desire not to think but 
to identify with or merge with “things-in-themselves,” in order to incorporate their “truth value,” 
as it were.  We must also consider the problematic of desire formulated by Jacques Lacan (1977), 
for if Lacan is correct, then all participants involved in the critical endeavor have struggled, since 
childhood, with deciphering and fulfilling what others desire.  The developing person asks, Che 
voui?, or What do you want (from me)?, yet finds that what is desired is never quite clear.  His 
only relief from this frustration is the hope that one day he will figure out exactly what is desired 
of him, satisfy those desires, make others happy, and therefore become happy himself.   
 
The logic of the hopeful yet tragic “desire of the Other,” when vastly simplified, suggests 
that individuals adopt other’s desires as their own and that individuals assume the role or duty of 
striving to satisfy the other’s desire, both of which efforts are directed at becoming the object of 
desire of the other.  Since one of our most basic (although often unconscious) desires is to fulfill 
what others desire, most of us have developed highly perceptive sensory apparatuses to discern 
what others like and dislike, lack, and need.  If a parent seems to lack a sympathizer in her 
beliefs about governmental regulation, or if a teacher seems to lack enthusiastic students in 
helping him create a community-service project, then this perceived need, this perceived desire, 
suggests to the child or the student an opportunity to repeat a pattern of working to satisfy the 
desire of the other.   
 
Whether the teacher makes his desires clear or hides them, and whether the student is 
aware of her desire to fulfill the teacher’s desire or not, how can a student develop a genuine, 
authentic, and creative relationship between herself and her own thinking-relationships if she 
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must contend with — but never consciously confront — the effects that the interaction of her 
desires and the teacher’s desires have upon her?  The student in such a situation is now 
concerned with managing a very different relationship than the one described by critical 
thinking: She must navigate the relationship between herself and the teacher and must use her 
own relationship with thought-objects not as a foundation for the critical examination of her own 
thinking-relationships but as a means to navigate the desire of the other.   
 
Earlier, we discussed some of the ways in which a teacher may use critical thinking to 
hide a personal or institutional agenda.  If it becomes clear (although likely not explicit) that the 
teacher desires that the students pretend to think critically while actually supporting the agenda 
of the teacher, then a student’s compliant reaction would indicate not critical thinking but merely 
obedient behavior, while a student’s negative reaction may appear to be a refusal of critical 
thinking when it is, in fact, a rebellion against being used by the teacher, an expression of 
autonomy and independence from the teacher.  While the latter response seems preferable, 
neither permits the student to engage in genuinely critical thinking.   
 
Similarly, the teacher who feels that her role is to give students what she perceives the 
student to desire — which may or may not be the actual desires of students and which may or 
may not be in the students’ best interests — is primarily concerned with obtaining evidence that 
she has, in fact, satisfied the students’ desires so that she can be satisfied.  Specifically, she may 
desire to possess that which she believes students to desire in her: knowledge, wit, charm, 
personality, the delivery of an enjoyable course, and the like.  Even in the case of the dedicated 
and seemingly selfless teacher who “does everything” for students and “gives students exactly 
what they want,” we find that we are returned to the teacher’s desire to satisfy the desire of the 
other.   
 
If a teacher fears that she is incapable of fulfilling students’ desires — and it is important 
to remember that none of us is certain that we are able to fulfill or even define the other’s desire 
— then she may react in any number of ways.  She may continue to try to satisfy students’ 
desires by pandering to students, lowering course expectations, or focusing on being 
‘entertaining’ and ‘fun.’ Alternatively, she may revisit her fear upon students by making students 
feel inadequate, by increasing the difficulty or severity of course assignments and assessments, 
by using the threat of low grades to cause student mental anguish, or even by explicitly or 
implicitly demeaning students who fail to meet expectations.  In this context, these actions would 
be undertaken to protect the teacher from the pain and shame associated with her failure to fulfill 
the other’s desire.   
 
While the disparagement of students serves as a defense against the student’s power to 
invalidate the teacher’s desirability, maligning students is also a convenient way to dismiss 
feelings of guilt about using students to serve desires, aims, and ends (some of which we have 
discussed above) that are not their own.  If students are just lazy narcissists, if their desires are 
vain and pointless anyway, then teachers may feel justified in coercing or pressuring students in 
order to transform them into something that will satisfy someone’s desire (the desire of the 
Chairperson, or the Dean, the local employer, etc.).   
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Of course, this dynamic is apparent in the actions and attitudes of students as well.  If a 
student fears that he is incapable of fulfilling the teacher’s desire, then the student may defend 
himself by withdrawing from the class environment, lagging behind on assignments, or cutting 
back on course preparation.  In only slightly more extreme cases, the student may rebel by 
undercutting the teacher’s efforts to lead a productive class, perhaps by interrupting the 
discussion with irrelevant comments, or by breaking into side conversations, or by means of 
similar diversions.   
 
In some cases, students may feel so angry about their apparent inability to satisfy the 
teacher (and thus, to satisfy themselves) that they may openly reject the teacher and the course, 
claiming that either or both are irrelevant, uninteresting, or torturous.  Of course, while these 
assessments may sometimes be accurate, they also likely reflect efforts to return an injury for an 
injury, since the student has suffered a blow to his esteem if he must admit that he is powerless to 
satisfy the teacher’s desire.  If he cannot be nor do what the teacher desires, if he cannot become 
the object of her desire, then, simply put, he feels undesirable.  If, in return, the student seeks to 
make the teacher feel undesirable, it is not merely out of petty vengeance but out of the need to 
lessen the psychological injury he has suffered.  If he is able to diminish the source of the injury 
to his esteem, if the teacher’s opinion is irrelevant because the teacher herself is bad or foolish, 
then her rejection of the student is much less painful.   
 
Conclusion: Critical Thinking and Ethical Practice  
 
We have sought to illustrate several scenarios by which psychological pressures arising in 
the context of the relationships between teachers, students, and learning institutions can interfere 
with the student’s capacity to engage in critical thinking.  Although rarely if ever discussed in the 
literature of critical thinking, we believe that in order to facilitate critical thinking, both teacher 
and the student must be ready to confront and traverse the psychic territories of aggression, 
defense, desire, and fantasy.  By the phrase, “confront and traverse… territories,” we mean 
simply that the teacher and student must be willing and able to engage in the examination and 
possible re-construction of their thinking-relationships, and, by extension, their actual 
relationship to themselves and others in the world.   
 
Authentically critical thinking-relationships can only be discovered once the underlying 
and often unconscious dynamics guiding existing thinking-relationships have been brought to 
light.  This is, no doubt, a difficult undertaking, for both teacher and the student must be willing 
and able to look carefully at the arrangement of their inner worlds, arrangements which may be 
profoundly associated with individuals’ senses of self, cherished beliefs, and connections to 
valued objects and ideals.  It is therefore a matter of ethical consideration that teachers and 
educators take care to protect students from undue psychological anguish when teaching critical 
thinking.  But this is not the only ethical ramification of the critical thinking endeavor as we have 
defined it.  Our brief conclusion to this paper consists of a reflection upon the relationship 
between the ideals of critical thinking and those of ethical conduct, in order to show not only that 
teaching critical thinking is, inherently, an ethical matter, but also that at least one formulation of 
an ideal of ethical conduct entails the notion of critical thinking as we have defined it. 
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to define the contours of ethical agency, personhood, 
or subjectivity, or to undertake a lengthy exposition of the meaning of ethical conduct.  
Nevertheless, we may take steps toward elucidating the substantial connection between critical 
thinking and ethics if we recall a distinction we have already referred to above in distinguishing 
between a capacity to act and a learned behavior, and in differentiating a “a living self in depth 
[that] has become the organizing center of the ego’s activities,” from a person who operates as if 
he were “a passively obedient automaton” (Kohut, 1971, p. 120).   
 
In his famous essay on liberty, Isaiah Berlin (1969) adds some helpful and familiar terms 
to this distinction under the aegis of the goal of attaining what he calls “positive freedom.”  
Berlin writes:  
 
I wish to be a subject, not an object, to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, 
which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from the outside.  I wish to 
be somebody, not nobody; a doer — deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and 
not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a 
slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my 
own and realizing them… I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, 
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by 
references to my own ideas and purposes. (p. 131)  
 
Because the discourses of subjectivity are so fraught with divisiveness over issues not pertaining 
to our concerns here, we propose to refer to the state of being endorsed by Berlin as personhood.  
To be a person, in a robust sense, signifies more than the possession of a human body; it refers to 
the ideal — which is never absolutely attainable — of being the author of one’s own thoughts 
and actions or “a center of initiative” in the world (Kohut, 1977, p. 99), rather than an object or a 
thing that reacts to actions taken by others.  Psychologically-speaking, personhood begins not 
with a thought or a declaration of “cogito ergo sum” (Descartes, 1985), but with the “feeling of 
existing… as a basic place to operate from” (Winnicott, 1986, p. 39).  This basic feeling of the 
self’s existence as “a unit, cohesive in space and enduring in time” (Kohut, 1977, p. 99) is an 
expression of the person’s integrity and security, an expression of the person’s wholeness and 
psychic boundaries.   
 
Integrity and security — or wholeness and boundedness, which amount to the same thing 
— refer not only to the person’s inner world but to his relationship to others in the world outside.  
To be integrated means that one can contain within the self the various aspects of one’s own 
personality and need not compulsively project the undesirable ones onto others or assimilate 
from others what seems to be lacking in the self.  Similarly, the ideal of secure self-boundaries 
means that one can relate with others without either becoming fused together with them or 
feeling impossibly separated from them.  Thus, if a person is able to develop the “sense of his 
presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person,” he 
will “encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm 
sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity” (Laing, 1969, 39).   
 
We have already discussed the challenges associated with navigating the desires of the 
teacher and the learning institution (and the student’s desire to satisfy these desires) in relation to 
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critical thinking.  These challenges may be understood in relation to a useful distinction between 
moral and ethical conduct, drawn in various ways by psychodynamically-sensitive ethical 
theorists, such as Erik Erikson (1964), Lawrence Kohlberg (1973), Jessica Benjamin (1998), and 
David Levine (2004).  If ‘moral’ conduct may be taken to refer to adherence to rules set by a 
moral group, and ‘ethical’ conduct may be understood as “the regard for others that becomes a 
part of our sense of our selves” (Levine, 2004, 29), that is, ethical regard for others derived from 
our own achievement of personhood, then the difference between moral and ethical conduct is 
considerable.   
 
Moral conduct, following this definition, has to do with securing connection to a moral 
authority or group by adhering to its rules.  What is “good” about moral conduct is not the nature 
of the action or even its effect upon others, but the degree to which it adheres to the rules and 
thereby affirms connection with the moral group.  That is, “moral thinking tends to separate 
content from subjective function.  The content of the rules does not much matter.  What matters 
is adherence to them” (Levine, 2004, 49).  The attention, in what we call ‘moral’ behavior, 
directed toward the group that defines the good, rather than the content of the conduct that may 
or may not be good, helps explain why individuals can commit horrific acts (such as the killing 
of innocents, the abuse of children, etc.) while experiencing themselves as morally “good,” for if 
these behaviors are expected or desired by the moral authority or moral group to which the 
individual belongs or desires to belong, then even the most hideous behavior may secure the 
sought-after connection.   
 
On the contrary, ‘ethical’ conduct is an expression of the ethical quality or character of 
the person, and “instantiate[s] regard for the self and others in the interaction of persons” 
(Levine, 2004, 49).  In ethical conduct, a person’s “secure self-boundaries form the basis for 
recognition of the boundaries of others,” just as “self-regard forms the basis for regard for 
others” (48).  In many ways, these descriptions of ethical conduct echo Immanuel Kant’s (1981) 
ethical principle of the categorical imperative, which holds that an ethical subject must respect 
others’ freedom and autonomy because the subject respects her own.  Unlike moral action, the 
value or “good” of ethical action resides not in following a rule or code, nor in associating 
oneself with an authority or group that gives the self its moral identity, but from the person’s 
affirmation of the very ideals and values the self has embraced in becoming a person.  As such, 
the ethical activity of the person is to embody her own personhood and to safeguard the 
personhood of others by acting in ways that facilitate or at least do not negate others’ efforts to 
be or become integrated persons. 
 
One of the greatest impediments to the achievement of both personhood and ethical 
conduct is the imposition of a moral code whereby the individual’s security and value are 
dependent upon adherence to a set of rules or codes established by an authority or group.  Such 
rules and codes may be considered moral, even if they are not explicitly concerned with 
morality, because what comes to define the individual’s relation to “the good” is, once again, not 
the content of her conduct but her ability and willingness to comply with the norms of the group.  
The value of the individual, in this case, is equivalent to her belonging, her sameness, her ability 
to obtain the conditional approval of others (parents, peers, authorities, members of the group) by 
acting as they act.  Likewise, her self-regard (her ability to feel “good” about herself) is 
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determined by how closely she can identify with the authority or group who are the holders of 
goodness.   
 
This organization of the individual’s inner world, which directs attention primarily 
toward the needs and desires of others, is what Winnicott (1965) refers to as the “false self.” The 
actions of the “false self” are compliant with the desires of the other because compliance is 
promised to sustain a connection to them, a connection upon which the individual who has not 
achieved the ideal of personhood desperately depends.  The actions of the false self, then, 
actually express the non-being of a person, since they turn the individual into an object of the 
other’s desire for the sake of a connection that is defined as “the good,” but that undermines the 
possibility that the individual become an integrated and secure person who embodies ethical 
character and who acts ethically for authentic and self-affirming reasons. 
 
The critical thinking-relationship, then, is an ethical relationship, as the facilitation of 
critical thinking is an ethical endeavor.  The student’s critical thinking-relationships, like his 
thinking-relationships, may be influenced and shaped by interactions with others in a multitude 
of ways, but, ultimately, they are his own.  In this sense, critical thinking can not be directly 
taught, but only facilitated.  If a teacher of critical thinking defines critical thinking as “the 
good,” and then lays out a set of rules, laws, or practices (or rituals) that must be followed in 
order for the student to attain the status of “critical thinker” and, thereby to hold the status of 
“good,” then the teacher has created a moral group and a moral law.  The teacher has placed the 
student in a difficult position where belonging to the moral group means complying with the 
rules and practices set forth by her, at the expense of the development of the student’s ethical 
integrity as a thinker and a person.   
 
Perhaps the greatest danger in secondary and higher education, and not only within the 
realm of critical thinking, is the temptation to consider education not as a project aimed at the 
enrichment of the student as an end in himself, but as a collective project of training or 
developing a “citizenry” or “labor force,” in which students are viewed as means of satisfying 
learning institutions’ needs, employers’ demands, communities’ goals, and the nation’s political 
and economic aspirations (Bowker, 2012).  Rather, for genuine critical thinking and ethical 
conduct to flourish, students must be offered environments in which they can safely yet freely 
explore, and, if necessary, challenge the pressures, desires, and demands that influence their 
thinking-relationships.  In many respects, the critical thinking teacher must create something that 
resembles what Winnicott called a “holding environment” (1965), a space where students feel 
secure enough and free enough to undertake the difficult work detailed above.  This environment 
must begin with a reassurance that the students will not be threatened, assaulted, or embarrassed 
by the teacher, by other students, or by the task of thinking critically.  From this security arises 
students’ ability to tolerate the frustrations and anxieties associated with critical examination. 
 
Therefore, the first step toward a truly critical pedagogy would be an active and on-going 
process of reflection by the teacher based on the recognition that she must critically examine her 
use of students as targets or containers for her own desires, which would impair the student’s 
ability to develop the new and complex thinking-relationships we have described.  Facilitating 
critical thinking and its correlates in the student is a complex practice that begins with the 
criticality of teachers who must contend with their own thinking-relationships and interpersonal 
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relationships before attempting to cultivate others’.  If both the teacher’s and the students’ 
desires, pressures, and relationship-dynamics can be recognized consciously and examined 
critically, then they will hold less sway over the course group than if they are left unexamined or 
denied.  Indeed, if desires, fantasies, and resistances can be encountered and critically thought 
about within the context of the course, they can serve as opportunities for the teacher to model 
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Notes 
1 Throughout the paper, we use the term “facilitate” in its most robust sense and in connection 
with the Winnicottian tradition (1965).  The facilitation of intellectual processes related to 
critical thinking is not passive, hands-off, or laissez-faire, or at least it is not necessarily so.  
Facilitation, in the sense in which we employ the term, may include periods of direct or intensive 
instruction, of listening, of questioning, or challenging, and more.  What is key about facilitation, 
and the reason we use this term, is that when one facilitates, one facilitates the capacities of 
another, in this case the student.  That is, the ideal of facilitation emphasizes the way that the 
student’s intellectual maturation — particularly in the case of critical thinking, which is all that 
we are concerned with in this paper — is related to the discovery of capacities and potentialities 
within the student, fostered and developed by the teacher and learning environment.  The 
antipode of facilitation is impingement, which emphasizes external imposition upon the student 
and the disruption of the student’s thinking- and critical thinking-activities by external forces and 
with external thought-objects (see also Bowker 2016).  While the two are always blended, it is 
important, we believe, to use the term, “facilitation” in relation to critical thinking, since it is 
especially important in this area to avoid impingement and to be attuned, responsive, and 
attentive to the student’s relationship to her own thinking-relationships.    
 
2 For instance, a fruitful but not technically critical instructional prompt in the case of Hamlet 
might be for the teacher to ask the student: “What do you think drives the primary tension in the 
drama?” Let us say the student replies: “I think Hamlet is indecisive because he still loves his 
mother.” The teacher then has an opportunity to facilitate a critical inquiry in several ways.  For 
instance, the teacher may ask: “Why do you think you find Hamlet’s love for his mother to be so 
important to the drama?” This question prompts the student to reflect on her own associations 
and thought-objects and how they may shape her reactions to and interpretations of Hamlet.  
There are, of course, numerous means and methods of inspiring critical thinking, so long as we 
recall that the emphasis here is not on training the student to read or understand Hamlet 
‘correctly,’ or in keeping with what other venerable interpreters have thought about Hamlet, but 
to direct her attention toward her own thinking-relationships.  Some studies have even suggested 
that offering provocative declarative statements may be as effective or more effective in 
inspiring students to ask questions (see Bowker 2010).  In this vein, an alternative to the 
critically-evocative question above may be simply to suggest to the student: “Perhaps the central 
tension driving the drama is Hamlet’s fear of becoming a murderer, and therefore, of becoming 
like Claudius, and therefore, of becoming morally akin to his own father’s murderer.” In the 
student’s response to this possibility, which, in the right environment, might include her defense 
of her own interpretation of the play and her view of the central importance of maternal love, the 
teacher may find equally productive material with which to work in directing the student to 
consider why she has chosen to construct the drama of Hamlet in the way that she has.  Here, it is 
important to note once again, as we have noted throughout the paper, that promoting critical 
thinking is not the only responsibility of teaching, and that to teach Hamlet is not only about 
teaching the student to critically reflect upon her own interpretations of Hamlet.  Since our 
purpose in this paper is to outline an admittedly exacting set of principles for facilitating 
genuinely critical thinking, we offer not a prescription for what all teachers of Hamlet must do, 
but merely an account of what critical thinking would look like if we were to take that 
pedagogical objective seriously, while remaining cognizant of its intellectual, relational, and 
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psychodynamic correlates.  In the imaginary dialogue offered above, the teacher does not 
necessarily forego instruction, direction, or even power vis-à-vis the student, nor does she 
rescind any rights to (re)turn to non-critical or extra-critical learning activities.  
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